The Geopolitical Consequences and the Reaction in the Asian-Pacific Region on the Virtual Sino-Taiwan Warfare Scenario: based on an analysis of the 2008 Russian-Georgia war

Gao Shuqin
Postdoctoral researcher
School of International Studies
Peking University
Beijing, China, 100871

After the end of the Cold War the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused the transformation of the security situation in the Eurasian Region, which included the pro-West democratic political reforms and a series of colorful revolutions, as well as the hot wars in the periphery of the Post-Soviet region including the Balkan conflicts. The 2008 Russian-Georgia war has determined the geopolitical transition situation and the balance of pro-American and counter-American alliances within the Eurasian region.

Aggression appears to have been used to punish Georgia for its pro-western foreign policy and to achieve the demise of the Georgian government. The Russian-Georgia War is the most recent major example that can be used to understand Washington’s response to China’s use of military force against Taiwan. Using the consequences of Russian-Georgia’s War and the shift of the geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet region, we can analyze the potential geopolitical transition in the Asian-pacific region after a virtual China-Taiwan War.

Compared with the Eurasian region, there is a parallel situation in the Asian-Pacific Region. The collapse of the Soviet Union has made China the primary target of US military alliances. Surrounding the People Republic of China, the U.S. have established a series of security alliances, including U.S. military bases in South Korea and have strengthened and extended the US-Japanese military alliance. This has provoked a sea resource dispute and hot war in South China Sea and the US troops and NATO troops in Afghanistan pressure China western boundary security. In other words, very serious security pressures have been formed around the People’s Republic of China. It

---

1 For background historical and legal detail see Rein Mullerson, ‘Precedents in the Mountains: on the parallels and uniqueness of the cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 2-25. Actually, a lot of Chinese scholars and Chinese authority have got consentience that the parallel phenomenon in Asia-Pacific region is Taiwan issues.

2 Postdoctoral researcher, School of International Studies, Peking University, Beijing, China, 100871. She can be contacted at gaoshuqin@pku.edu.cn. The author wishes to thank Professor Nick Bisley, School of Politics and International Relations, La Trobe University (Australia) for his professional supervision and being given strong academic support, Dr. Daniel Bray, Lecturer in International Relations, School of Politics and International Relations, La Trobe University for his very helpful academic discussions and academic support, as well as Miss Elissa.C from the School of Politics and International Studies, Latrobe University and Master Student A.Park from London School of Politics and Economy for their excellent research assistance. The Author also is grateful to the Russian, Eastern European and Eurasian Studies Center, University of Illinois, U.S for providing the author the grant for summer research and opportunity for free access to the e-resources at the University library database during summer research School, 2010.

3 This paper was presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies (AACaPS) in Canberra, 3-4 February 2011. It has been peer reviewed via a double referee process and appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright.
is possible that the Taiwan and North Korea situation will cause the next hot war, reshaping the Asian-Pacific security architecture. What security tendency will form after the Virtual Sino-Taiwan warfare Scenario? What would be the reaction of the Asian-Pacific countries and regional security organizations? What is the future of geopolitical security situation in the Asian-Pacific Region?

**Key Words:** Asian-Pacific region, Sino-Taiwan War, Russian-Georgian War, Geopolitical transition

**Historical Parallels between the Sino-Taiwan and Russian-Georgian Contexts**

Why did I choose to compare the Sino-Taiwan situation with the Russian-Georgia War? The legacy of the Cold War is two unfinished civil wars in Asia-Pacific region - Taiwan and Korea - which are key elements in U.S. policy toward the Asian-Pacific region and global communist expansion. Actually, the US approach to the Taiwan Strait issue was made in response to an escalation of the Korean War and the situation in Japan, People Republic of China as well as South-Eastern Asia. Particularly, during the Vietnam Conflict, Taiwan served as a major support base for US forces, especially in the years before 1972, when the U.S military base in Taiwan remained dominated by the army throughout this period and U.S. assistance was provided to the island’s entire defense establishment. Therefore, the current mounting crisis over the North Korea nuclear-weapons program and the threat of war in North Korea war is linked to escalating U.S.-Japanese-South Korea military maneuvers. Finally, the post-Cold War independence claims of Taiwan have renewed the possibility of Taiwan War.

Before the Russian-Georgia War, the Russian provocative actions were centered around Abkhazia, not South Ossetia. Georgia was caught unprepared by the escalating tensions in the latter region in late July and early August. Russia had opened the second front in Abkhazia without any provocation or pretext whatsoever. The situation escalated tensions across the region and caused a high level of military conflict. Similarly, the North-South Korea dispute could escalate if six-party talks cannot resolve the Korean peninsula problem during a necessary period and the U.S military base and the U.S-South Korean military cooperation will reinforce, creating an increasingly hostile security environment in the Asian-Pacific region and a geopolitical problem for the People’s Republic of China. The PRC must then be focused on improving the security environment, and altering the current geopolitical situation. Even through the Korean Peninsula problem will be resolved under the six-party talks, the U.S military cooperation with Japan and South Korean will be strengthened in the North-Eastern Asian region and the People Republic of China have to seek a new marine outfall.

Taiwan plays an important role in U.S. strategy in East Asia: Taiwan is a beacon for a future democratic China, and also is a critical piece in the security structure of the Asia-Pacific region. Security in the Taiwan Strait is not only an issue between China and Taiwan, but an

---

essential part of regional peace and the U.S. strategy toward to the Asian-Pacific region. As the heritage from World War II, the cooperation in land operations between Chinese, British and American forces in South Asia against the Japanese in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater in the early 1940s is the most famous and commemorative episode of cooperation. Therefore, the U.S. posture on Taiwan remains fundamentally ‘no-war, no-peace status quo’ to prevent a united China from challenging U.S. hegemony in Asia as well as across the globe, particularly if the U.S. and the U.S military alliances were put to the test in a Sino-Taiwan war.

The heritage of U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation has been revived and consolidated, and the long lasting military relationship has been built upon a convergence of strategic interests: in containing Communist expansion in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War era. The signing of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty in late 1954, and the establishment earlier that decade of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Taipei not only assured the security and continuity of the Taiwan government, but also enabled a more complete network of military alliances between the U.S. and Asian-Pacific democracies.

Based on more than half-century close security cooperation between Taiwan and the U.S, Taiwan and Washington work together to find new and innovative approaches to Taiwan’s defense transformation in dealing with the mixture of cross-strait rapprochement and Chinese military expansion, and in coping with future transnational and non-traditional security threats. The current defense reform in Taiwan is crucial to enable the Taiwan armed forces to acquire the necessary capability for new missions in the 21st century. By 2010, the Taiwan authorities imported different kinds of aggressive weapons from Western countries. Its success will not only defend Taiwan’s democracy but also the U.S common security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The upgrade of the U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation in the past decades has been a response to the rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army of PRC. Taiwan’s defense transformation has been closely associated with U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, with the new developments of Washington’s extended strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific, Taipei’s quest for defense modernization and balance in the Taiwan Strait, and, probably more importantly, the shared concerns over China’s growing military power.

There are at least nine specific areas of U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation that are distinct from the years before the 1996 missile crisis. These originated from a combination of three developments: emerging new organizational and operational concepts in military affairs; the growing imbalance of military strength across the Taiwan Strait; and the objective of Taiwan’s defense transformation in dissuading a possible Chinese use of force, and so to prevent an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, through maintaining adequate and affordable armed forces and sustainable defense capability.
The division of the Korea was the result of the military-political compromise between the U.S and the USSR, not the direct work of the U.S and PRC, through North Korea with PRC as the relationship between lip and teeth from geographic view. The Korean peninsula crisis like other conflicts such as the Afghanistan War, the conflicts in Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan have occurred around Chinese vulnerable boundary and have gradually eroded China’s security environment and strategic space. In order to concentrate resources on economic-social development and construction, prevent to have been interrupted internal china’s economic-social development and has been draw to any War and arms race, Chinese authority keeps forbear and warning, from on hand, from other hand, Chinese has produced a serious foreign reaction an military training, particularly consolidate and develop SOC to response the escalation of conflicts and military pressure surrounding the Chinese boundary, develop modern military technology and power.

After the end of Cold War a series of conflicts happened around Russia’s boundary and in the former Soviet zone of influence: NATO extended, the orange revolution as well as the U.S military base have been established in the post-Soviet region. All those changes pressure Russian strategic space. Therefore, assessing the 2008 Russian-Georgia war, I would like to define as Russian experiment through the hot War to strangling with West countries and maintain the former Soviet State approach to the U.S. and NATO, rather than Russian aggressive war pressure the George and South Caucasus, Moscow maintains a position that it has the right to first agree to any action another country wants to take in former-Soviet states such as Georgia. Through the Russian-Georgia War, Russia has changed the security situation surrounding the Russian boundary and has determined the geopolitical dividing line between Russian and the West alliance in the post-Soviet region.

Comparing the progress of the geopolitical transition of the Eurasian and Asian-Pacific Region, we find a similar historic progress: the Eurasian and Asian-pacific Region as the West front and Eastern Front during the World War II, respectively. The U.S. and Western countries want to conquer Eurasian and Asian continent, Great Power Russia and PRC of those regions. The series of independence followed the collapse of Soviet Union, and new states have emerged in post-soviet region, particularly following Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, which has received formal diplomatic recognition by Taiwan that has opened the door for diplomatic relations between these two breakaway states. The position of PRC (like Russia) that is to oppose Kosovo independence, it has pledged to not recognize Kosovo and lashed out against Taiwan for its message of support. Mainland China criticized Taiwan for its expression of support for Kosovo's newfound independence. It angrily informed Taiwan that, as it is part of China, it has no right to give recognition to Kosovo or to anyone else for that matter. In the 1990s, when the Baltic republics declared their independence from the Soviet Union it was not until the popular will was manifested through referenda that other nations acknowledged them. In this cause, the 1996 missile crisis in the
Taiwan Strait and the dispute about Taiwan War was scattered throughout world. In the same way, when Taiwan vacillates on the question of independence, this discounts the quality of its declarations.

By the beginning of the 21 Century, using the anti-terrorist military operation as excuse, the U.S. military bases have been established in the world’s main geopolitical points and the U.S and NATO troops have provoked conflicts around China’s and Russia’s boundaries. This similar situation and connection is main reason why the PRC and Russia have started to develop their strategic cooperation and strategic partner relationship. Therefore, we think that PRC reasonably response to conflicts in Eurasian region, including Russian-Georgian War, position of Taiwan authority reacted to the Caucasus and Kosovo efforts to independence.

Georgia’s geographic location close to the Caucasus, Iran and Afghanistan as far as on the Black Sea region is significant both for Russia and for the U.S strategy. Georgia has applied to join the EU and the NATO, has become the centre point in extending Western democracy and ideology as well as military bases. In addition, Tbilisi is also very important for the oil-gas pipeline from the Caspian region to the Black Sea region and South-West Europe. It is an important goals for Russia to control the situation in the Caucasus region and maintain marine outfall toward to the Black Sea region, strongly bit post-Soviet regional states which posture to join the NATO and EU, against Russia and pro-U.S groups, conducting a hot war.

Respectively, the Taiwan geographic location is especially important for both the U.S. and China strategy toward to the Asian-Pacific region and has become the center in preventing communist expansion from the North-Eastern Asia to South-Eastern Asia. Here, defending democracy and preserving stability is merely "to put the US into a defensible position". Taiwan connects North-Eastern Asia to South-Eastern Asia, linking up the U.S-Japan military base, the U.S-Korean military base, the ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand. The Taiwan Strait is the main route for Chinese oil and other marine transport, as well as for South Korea and Japan.

What situation will cause Sino-Taiwan War? Using the Russian-Georgian War as our point of departure, we can see that China-Taiwan War will occur on 3 different levels: Firstly, Taiwan posture to independence in those causes such as the in PRC mainland fall into political-economic recession crisis as well as social crisis, or China mainland will be in hot war with the. U.S and others relative allay. With the support of the U.S. the Taiwan authority will grab unprecedented historical chance to reach independence status. As Taiwan catch up all opportunity to implement independence because Taiwan cannot ensure it will be recognized by other nations if it declares independence, but it will surely not be recognized if it does not affirm its independence. This is why Beijing is doing everything in its power to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence, and
Beijing never pledge to not use its military in Taiwan issues. If Taiwan declared independence, with the Taiwan islands as a sovereign territory and sovereignty rooted in the people of Taiwan, with legal separation from the mainland, Beijing would have little choice but to engage it militarily.

The Taiwan no war, no peaceful status quo had been the work of the PRC and the US—not of the PRC and Taiwan themselves—who had never accepted the division as legitimate or permanent. The people Republic of China official authority always accept Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, own the territorial integrity and sovereignty over Taiwan. Chinese territory and sovereignty has not been split, and the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and China Mainland are internal state, they are not two states. Chinese attitude toward to Taiwan issue totally different from North Korea crisis, Afghanistan war and others. The PRC principle toward to Taiwan issues is that Taiwan is inter China’s issues, China toward to Taiwan War is the civil war. Despite ruling over its island as a 'de facto' independent nation and having full internal sovereignty, Taiwan has diplomatic ties with just 23 countries due to a territorial claim by neighboring China. The strategy which China uses to deny formal relations to Taiwan is to force other countries to choose between relations with either Taiwan or China, but not both.

Since Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration as president of Taiwan in May 2008, mainland China and Taiwan have established direct shipping, air transport, and postal links; opened Taiwan to mainland tourists; and increased financial cooperation. The two sides are now negotiating a far-reaching economic cooperation agreement. This new atmosphere has greatly reduced the chances of a cross-strait confrontation that might draw the United States and China into a military conflict. But, the Asian political-military’ situation very different from the economic development, on contradictory, progress with compression of economic cooperation. Therefore, The China-Taiwan political-military is going on contradictory progress not such as the cultural-economical cooperation.

Through the historical views China has always tried to get Taiwan back to unify with mainland no matter through which way. When the U.S. troops and United Nations forces intervened in the Korean civil war on June 27, 1950, China had already tried to grasp unprecedented opportunity for liberation of Taiwan in a final campaign of its protracted civil war, was preparing for the PRC and Taiwan war. Even through after 1945 Chinese communist party 3 times was in preparing to liberate and recaptureTaiwan. All those efforts failed to establish authority of China’s central government in territory Taiwan, and all those process was going between China’s central military and Taiwan local military under the support of foreign forces.

The second scenario: The important is the need to integrate strategic political efforts with military preparedness. China has appreciated the power of American military might demonstrated in
the Iraqi wars of 1991 and 2003, and the Afghanistan campaign in 2001-2002, but BJ remains undaunted by possible US intervention in a Taiwan Strait scenario. The Korean War redounded to Taipei’s benefit since it forced Mao Zedong to postpone indefinitely his planned 1951 assault on Taiwan. The present Korean peninsula crisis will provide the PRC historical opportunity to completely resolve issues unification with Taiwan.

China’s goal in pressuring Taiwan from independence and insisting on the one-China position is basically to reserve the right to launch a civil war against Taiwan on the grounds that the cross-strait standoff is an internal affair. Therefore, the Taiwan strait situation highly unpredictable, and this is something everyone concerned about peace in the Asian-Pacific Region should think deeply upon.

In current circumstances, the most likely precipitant of a PRC attack would be not only Taiwan’s pro-independence activities, but also the overall security situation in the Asian-pacific Region, particularly Korea peninsula crises is escalating, and the United States wants to Leave Taipei in doubt about American support if such activities do provoke war.

The third scenario: from next presidency relationship between China mainland and Taiwan unpredictable, even though current relationship between PRC mainland and Taiwan is peaceful and more cooperative than in 1990s. The rise of China’s economic and military power has fundamentally changed the global power balance and brought about the re-assessment of strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly, the unification of Hong Kong, Macao with Chinese mainland, With the shift of the strategic core of the U.S to Asian-pacific region, PRC will face more serious pressure from the U.S and more vulnerable security environment in Asian-Pacific region, including Taiwan Strait, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regions, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, as well as South China’s Sea region, Eastern China’s sea region. But, on the North-Eastern, North and North-Western China’s boundary, China will get political-military support from the Russia, SOC and Pakistan, particularly, in the next decade Russia and Central Asian countries can’t sacrifice China to get benefit from the U.S and the west Countries, from other hand the sustainable increase of Indian influence as well as terrorist active causes Pakistan close to China.

Therefore, on the Western, North and Eastern-North direction, China can get the support form own strategic partners. But on the south and South-Este direction, China face very strong military block from the U.S including Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Australia and etc. It will be possible through the China-Taiwan War establish new China’s military bases and determine new geopolitical division in the Asian-pacific Region, in the meantime, unite Taiwan territory, interrupt the U.S military supply and the military allay geographic connectivity, particularly, during the U.S. and their alley deeply in financial crises and global military reemploy and concentrate into Iraq, Afghanistan and Koran peninsula.

**The approach of the Russian-Georgia War and its influence on the Chinese Military**

---

Attitude to the Taiwan Issue

Irrespective of how the Russian-Georgian war began, Russia’s response, based on its stated aims and rationale, lacked substance – indicating that this war was only, ostensibly about south Ossetia. Dr. Svante E. Conerll describes in his research work,\(^6\) that the rapid development of coordinated ground, air and naval attacks within hours of Georgia’s entry into Tskhinvali, could not have been undertaken without meticulous and long planning- especially the landing of several thousand troops and armor by sea in Abkhazia. Russia immediately engaged in the bombing of military and economic targets across Georgia’s territory. A massive cyber - attack ensued on Georgian official and non-governmental mass internet sites. Russia then enforced a blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coast, bombed a rail road bridge connecting western and eastern Georgia, and engaged in further moves to effectively threaten Georgia’s statehood and economic viability. Russia also occupied and subsequently refused to withdraw from key cities well outside the conflict zone that were not included in any security measures approved by the cease-fire, most notably Poti.\(^7\)

In agreement with Dr. Conerll’s research, I do view the Russian-Georgia War as the escalation of Abkhazia conflicts. After the Russian-Georgia War, Russian authorities formally recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while retaining firm military and political control over these territories and their leadership. Russia claimed to be acting in self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations charter. Russia legitimized its action as a necessary defense to maintain the unity of the state and ensure peace amongst its citizens. The situation in Georgia also provided Russia with a well-placed opportunity to pay back the U.S. and NATO for their action over Kosovo.\(^8\)

The PLA of the People’s Republic of China is systematically analyzing lessons learned from the Russian-Georgia War and these conflicts, closely watching the continuing struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to find the means to achieve Taiwan reunification, despite the likelihood of US intervention. These lessons include: the need in modern warfare for the armed forces to fight jointly; the efficacy of airpower, especially when armed with precision guided munitions; the fact that space is a vital warfare theater; the importance of information operations; the necessity of fielding special operations forces; and the importance of doctrinal development. The implementation of a PLA e-blockade strategy has also been argued. This strategy aims to disrupt Taiwan’s utilities, internet, and communication networks, which would strike heavily at the island’s economy, as well as the government’s ability to function.\(^9\)

In recent years, China has adopted a more aggressive policy towards Taiwan. As it does not yet possess the capability to thwart Taiwan’s pursuit of independence through direct military assault, its

---


military planners have focused on developing other forms of coercion, ‘including missile strikes, blockades, and cyber-warfare’.\textsuperscript{10}

In 2005 PRC legislature passed the Anti-Secession Law, which threatens the use of non-peaceful means in the event that Taiwan secedes from China. To make this threat credible even in the face of potential U.S. intervention, Beijing has steadily upgraded its missile, submarine, electronic, and amphibious attack capabilities.\textsuperscript{11}

Chinese military plans against Taiwan are aimed at weakening Taiwan and delaying U.S. military intervention. Beijing must arrange an overwhelming amount of military forces to delay U.S. deployments to the vicinity surrounding Taiwan. On the other hand, U.S. forces must maintain effective countermeasures against any significant attempt by Beijing, sustain an unambiguous ability to interdict Chinese forces without attacking a wide range of targets on the mainland.

To add to this, China is about to reinforce its military presence in the Indian Ocean. To extend and develop the trading route through which China receives much of its imported oil from the Middle East. This presents a classic, Mahanian requirement for a large naval presence. Chinese energy supply security needs appear to be leading Beijing to initiate significant naval expansion across the Indian Ocean. Beijing has already moved to establish port facilities in Burma and Pakistan. China’s (prime minister?), Wen Jiabao, visited Cambodia on April 7, 2006 offering Cambodia $600 million in loans and grants for development, along with naval patrol ships. Future moves may be forthcoming to support PLAN operations west of the Malacca Strait.\textsuperscript{12}

These military arrangements were subsequently inked and formalized under the adoption of Russia's new National Security Strategy. "Military forces" could be used in "the competition for resources". China is today boosting its military presence outside its own territory. The island in South China Sea is also for the first time explicitly threatening to use its military forces to protect its interests in the region. Accordingly, China’s effort to expand its military presence in the area has led to support based on the goal of stability and has even provided incentives for local regimes. In the meantime it is restricting the U.S. Alliance Naval from intervening in a Sino-Taiwan war in the future.

About the issue of geography: as noted earlier, Taiwan’s air force is based at relatively few positions, with little flexibility. The likely opponent, on the other hand, has the benefit of flying from a continent with the capacity of hosting a very large number of bases. Adding to the TAF’s (Taiwan’s Air Force) geographical disadvantages is the PLAAF’s possession of aerial refueling and a modern aircraft with greater range that will allow the PLAAF to conduct a multi-axes approach to Taiwan, not just from the west. Hence, Taiwan’s Air Force would face a 360-degree threat from an

\textsuperscript{10} Robert Hartfiel and Brian L.Job: Raising the risks of War: defence spending trends and competitive arms processes in East Asia. P.11.

\textsuperscript{11} Yun-Han Chu and Andrew J. Nathan: seizing the opportunity for Change in the Taiwan Strait. The Washington Quarterly 2007-2008 Winter. P.78.

attacker.\textsuperscript{13}

Like the Russian attack on Georgia, with use of modern weapons and armed power, China will launch an unprovoked military assault. Taiwan must either match its military capabilities to its political goals, or change those goals to reflect the commitment it is willing make to defense.

The War in Georgia, it was felt, has clearly exposed problems both in weaponry and operational capability.\textsuperscript{14} But the speed of victory also clearly distinguished the Russian-Georgia War from two Chechen Wars. Russia was armed with a high-technology weapons system that was well-conducted and effective in the peacemaking operation during the Georgia war.\textsuperscript{15}

In the opening phase of a military conflict, will China (as many anticipate) immediately employ its air power and missiles to attack TAF bases and search for air base sanctuaries as it did during the Korean War?

Beijing might decide to launch quick, massive military operations against Taiwan to reduce U.S. opportunities for intervention. The first is a full-scale amphibious assault of PLA, which reflects the opinion of most experienced observers that the PLA has both the capability and the desire to carry out such a massive, complex, and destructive operation now. Amphibious operations on a lesser scale, however, are well within PLAN capabilities. The second option is: a massive, sudden strike with aerospace assets, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as manned aircraft that will leave the island so reeling that it is forced to acquiesce to Beijing’s demands before US military assistance can arrive. All of these options - as well as variations and combinations of them - are viable and must be anticipated by Taiwan’s military. Finally, the Taiwan military may not even be the direct target in a Chinese campaign to force Taipei into direct negotiations on its terms. The Taiwan military may end helplessly watching its civilian masters concede strategic and operational advantages.

While a full-scale amphibious invasion cannot be ruled out, it is almost certainly Beijing’s least preferred option for using military force. More likely is a less massive, but not necessarily less violent series of military steps, a significant element of which will be an information warfare (IW) campaign focused against Taiwan. This was the model of campaign against India in 1962 and against Vietnam in 1979. Beijing would be taking a significant risk employing this model against Taiwan. However, in view of the likely intervention of the United States, this option may be considered.

Beijing will almost certainly, assuming that Taiwan and possibly the United State will launch strikes against the mainland, call upon every available air defense asset to fight against an anticipated cruise missile and aircraft strike. But Washington may react to the employment of

\textsuperscript{14} Hans-Hennings, Schroder : a short victorious War, Russian perspective on the Caucasus crisis
military force against American interest. The Chinese Information Operation community envisions CNO effectively deterring or delaying U.S. intervention, allowing China to cause enough pain to compel Taipei to capitulate before the United States arrives.

First is the fact that such a conflict may not be a single campaign fought to an end accepted by all parties. Instead, Beijing may fight a series of campaigns, if the first ends in continued Taiwan de facto independence, China may pull back, regroup, and re-aim, launching another effort.

When Chinese strategists contemplate how to affect U.S. deployments, they confront the limitation of their current conventional force, which does not have the range sufficiency to interdict U.S. facilities or assets beyond the Japanese home islands.\footnote{James Mulvenon PRC Information Operations Myths, Trends, and New opportunities. Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang. Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security. P250.}

China’s military preparations for potential conflict over Taiwan have focused on delaying or slowing the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and potentially frustrating U.S. military operations around the island if a conflict erupts. Maritime denial also enhances the security of China’s wealthiest provinces and cities such as Guangdong and Shanghai, which could become military targets in a conflict over Taiwan. Finally, it strengthens China’s ability to counter efforts to blockade its ports or adjacent sea lanes that link with its trading partners.\footnote{M.Taylor Fravel: China’s Search for Military Power. The Washington Quarterly. Summer 2008. P131.}

Over the course of the next fifteen to twenty years, questions relating to terrorism and other transnational issues could arise in other quadrants around China’s periphery. For example, Tibet in the post Dalai Lama era could give rise to some particularly delicate conditions drawing PLA attention. Uighur separatism is likely to continue to be a focus because of the need to consider what would necessarily be an expensive communication protection force in Southeast and South China. But for all the political pain it caused the Bush administration in Central Asia, in fact it was not viewed as terribly significant in Beijing. Rather what was more important was the PLA dealing with the Taipei military. This means that Beijing is prepared to deter, delay, deflect and if necessary, defeat the United States in the Taiwan theater.

The balance of military power in the Western Pacific is shifting in China’s favor. By 2015, China is likely to enjoy a significant quantitative advantage in a conflict with the United States. The Government in Taipei believes itself boxed in by China’s military superiority and the lack of international support. Its military commanders are ordered to prepare a maximum effort to attack Chinese military and civilian targets. Beijing learnt of this preparation and interpreted it as a measure of Taipei’s desperation, which significantly increases China’s belief that immediate, more intensive military operations are required.\footnote{Bernard D. Cole The Military Instrument of Statecraft at Sea Naval Options in an Escalatory Scenario Involving Taiwan: 2007-2016. Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang. Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security. P204.}

This goes directly to the point of decision of a military conflict between China and Taiwan: it will be a complicated military and political as well as economic campaign. Taipei can win the former only with US assistance and can win the latter only if the military and civilian people of
Taiwan maintain their will to fight, to resist, and to preserve their independence.\textsuperscript{19} Without immediate US assistance that defense would almost certainly be overwhelmed within ten days. Taiwan’s military strategists would prefer not to assume immediate US intervention, but intend on planning independent and autonomous operations, while of course hoping for eventual US assistance. This may be why Taiwan’s defense establishment does not want to base its strategy completely on strategic endurance, by simply waiting for Washington to make a decision and for US forces to move over the distances involved.

\textbf{Reaction of Alliance of both the U.S.A. and the Georgia to the Russian-Georgia’s War and the reaction of the Alliance of the U.S.A. to the Virtual Sino-Taiwan warfare Scenario}

Western countries failed to foresee Russia’s invasion in spite of multiple indications that a Russian-Georgian war was forthcoming. Western Leaders failed to plan for the contingency of Russia simply ignoring the terms of a cease-fire agreement it had signed, and failed to prevent Russia from setting up buffer occupation zones outside the secessionist territories. When the Russian-Georgian war happened, western leaders lacked instruments to respond.

French and American negotiators appear to have failed to understand the consequences of the terms of the cease-fire agreement they negotiated, most specifically the loopholes and lack of clarity. European international institutions failed to respond coherently to that war, such as in previous crisis in the Caucasus region like the Tsitelubani attack a year prior to the Russian-Georgian war, the downing of a Georgia UAV in March, and Putin’s April 16 decree.

Therefore, Russia has mounted a direct challenge to the norms and principles of European security. This challenge arguably constitutes the most serious danger to the European security architecture since the Cold War ended, because it undermines the very assumption that European security is built upon. While Europe has been moving toward the realization of a zone of prosperity, peace and democracy, Russia seeks a return to a division of the continent into spheres of influence. It is sending strong signals to both Russia and the states on its periphery, as are steps to attach costs directly to Russia for its aggression.\textsuperscript{20} That demonstrated, there are limits to the support Georgia can expect from the West countries for its defense and security, and Georgia has to take appropriate measures to include this consideration in its risk assessment.

The West’s failure to intervene legitimately in Georgia reduces the prospects of strong western action to strengthen and broaden the east-west energy transportation corridor across the South Caucasus. Central Asian states may be better served by turning to China to secure diversity in their energy export.

\textsuperscript{20} Svante E. Conerll: Russia’s war in Georgia: Causes and implications for Georgia and the World. Central-Asia Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, August, 2008. PP 28-29
provide Moscow with what it perceived as a low-risk opportunity to punish Georgia for its independent foreign policy, halt NATO expansion, and restore its own primacy in the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the West and their alliances have failed to attach costs to Russia’s earlier and escalating aggressive acts against Georgia and other post-Soviet states. The Russian-Georgia war was a tool of Russian imperial influence and a scenario for destroying the gains of the orange revolution.

The alliance of Georgia, GUAM, is more like a club of countries dissatisfied with Russia than a practical transnational institution. The anti-Russian rhetoric and direction of the organization was not enough to cement the weak military, economic and political ties between countries. The Russian-Georgian war became the first real test for the organization since its founding.

Although concern about a potential threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity from Russia increased after the war in Georgia, from this perspective, the Ukrainian reaction to the war in Georgia was foreseeable. But during the Russian-Georgian War, Turkish and Ukrainian planes, tasked to assist Georgia in putting out the forest fires in Borjomi and Caspian, were denied permission by the Russian military to enter Georgian airspace.

Actually, Ukraine was only able to demonstrate political support to Georgia, with Poland, Estonia and Lithuania, providing humanitarian aid to Georgia. Ukraine started to implement new regulation for the movement of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukrainian waters, politically demanding statement against Russian interference and calling for a withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia.

The weak response of western countries had negative consequences on its image in Azerbaijan and alliance countries of Georgia. The inability of Western countries, in particular the United States, to respond adequately to Russia’s actions led to gross disappointment among the public.

The public previously accused the West of applying double standards in its relations with the states of the South Caucasus. This was particularly true with regard to the public perception of the Karabakh war and Western support of Armenia. The Georgia conflicts demonstrated the West’s inability to protect a young and emerging democracy, and NATO’s inability to fight with Russia. After such developments, it will be extremely difficult for the Azerbaijan public to continue to believe in Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership. Instead, it is likely that Azerbaijan will try to further soften its approach and work to maintain good relations with Moscow.

Despite the fact that Azerbaijan was not directly involved in the conflict, the war forced it to re-evaluate its priorities and long-term strategies. The Russian-Georgia war put Baku in a very

21 Ibid., PP 27-28  
22 Ibid., PP 21.  
delicate position. Abstaining from supporting an ally would have negatively impacted Azerbaijan’s image abroad and in the public eye. On the other hand, active support of Georgia would have infuriated Russia and could have led to a deterioration of relations. In the end, Azerbaijan chose a strategy of soft support for Georgia, stating that Azerbaijan favored a solution to the South Ossetia conflict based on the maintenance of Georgia territorial integrity and Georgian adherence to international law.

While Georgia and Ukraine first took firm stands against the Russian invasion, Azerbaijan with Moldova did not rush to support Georgia. All these consequences were correctly assessed by the Azerbaijani government. Siding with Georgia, as Ukraine and other Eastern European countries did, would not help Georgia but could harm Azerbaijan in many ways. Azerbaijan chose instead to support Georgia economically and on the basis of bilateral relations rather than within the GUAM framework. The reaction to the Russian-Georgian war has demonstrated that as an organization GUAM has already been dormant for a certain period of time after the Russian-Georgian War.26

Although a multidimensional and widely support mechanism, the European security architecture is not flawless. It is well known that the European security mechanism (NATO) actually promoted the long-running break-up of Yugoslavia, as well as the 2003 Iraq intervention. But Georgia did not benefit from the European Security Mechanism or the U.S.A alliance even through Georgia aligned with a pro-west foreign policy and security standpoint. Not only is Georgia not a member of NATO, but more importantly their war opponent is Russia, and in this case, the Georgian alliance (the anti-Russian organization; GUAM) has failed to intervene in that war.

Similarly, Taiwan is not member of any Asian security organizations, neither the formation of the ASEAN regional nor the security cooperation at APEC. During a China-Taiwan war scenario, what will be the reaction of the countries that are a part of the international security organization and allied with the U.S.A in the Asian-Pacific region?

The Asian-Pacific region now has three modes of security policy: (1) a set of traditional military approaches dominated by U.S. bilateral alliances, (2) a series of ongoing and broadly focused multilateral efforts comprising intergovernmental and unofficial track II discussions, and (3) a number of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms designed to deal with specific problems or functional issue areas. In this region, U.S. military power is organized through a set of bilateral alliances and alignments, the most important feature of which is the forward deployment of significant military assets in Japan, South Korea, Australia and the tacit commitments the U.S.A. has to Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Formed during the Cold War, these alliances have survived the region’s recent geopolitical and geo-economic transformation largely intact.27

26 Anar Valiyer: Azerbaijan after the Russian-Georgian War. P73
Additionally, nations not directly involved in Taiwan issues (Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, etc) will also react to individual and national decisions and actions in ways that are likely to affect the scenario.\footnote{Bernard D. Cole The Military Instrument of Statecraft at Sea Naval Options in an Escalatory Scenario Involving Taiwan: 2007-2016, Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang. Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security. P205} Based on the experience of the Russian-Georgian war, we can look to these countries to provide no more than political support and economical aid as was Azerbaijan’s attitude during the Russian-Georgian war. Particularly, with the economic growth and enlargement of the free trade zone between China and South-Eastern Asia, those countries economically deeply dependent on China economies and markets, will still face with serious internal problems.

Indeed, they are neither willing nor able to resist China. In addition, American mutual defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia do not commit those nations to support US military action against China in order to defend Taiwan. For one thing, none of those nations recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country and like the United States “do not challenge” Beijing’s claim that the island is part of China. Furthermore, all recognize the growing economic and strategic gravitas China brings to Asia. Japan’s attitude would be the most important, given the presence on Japanese territory of major US military bases.

The Asian-Pacific region emphasizes bilateral alliances and self-reliance, which distinguishes it from the European collective multilateral security mechanism (NATO). Taiwan is not located within the framework of a U.S. multilateral security mechanism in the Asian-Pacific region. From those bilateral alliances, the U.S.A. has the commitment to their alliances, but has no commitment to the Taiwan Strait. However, Japan and Australia\footnote{Interview with Professor Nick, Bisley, Melbourne, Australia, Junarny 30, 2010.} are strong enough American allies that they might - albeit reluctantly - support US military action against China in support of Taiwan.

Although Taiwan may be the most fraught issue politically, perhaps the trickiest issue currently is competition for resources in the ocean areas lying between Japan and China. Many experts believe the quantity of oil and gas resources, while not trivial, is not enormous. Especially for Japan, the issue appears to be more related to questions of sovereignty and Tokyo is rather focused on compelling Beijing to observe international norms.

Japan’s ultimate ambitions toward Taiwan remain perhaps the most important short-and medium-term concern. BJ. Bernard and D. Cole point out, that Japan are prepared to get underway for operations within ninety-six hours, one of these ships will be able to comply, but the second one is in a dry dock for replacement of its screw and will require ten days to be ready to operate. The U.S. Seventh Fleet commander informally asked his Japanese counterpart if Japanese minesweepers might be tasked with substituting for the inoperative U.S. ship, and this request has been relayed to Tokyo. This has caused the Japanese government to protest against the U.S. government, warning it against escalating the crisis in the Taiwan Strait by unjustifiably involving Japan.\footnote{Bernard D. Cole The Military Instrument of Statecraft at Sea Naval Options in an Escalatory Scenario Involving Taiwan: 2007-2016, Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang. Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security. P200.
However, the U.S. also needs to give serious thought to the possible negative medium-and long-term consequences of a continued expansion in Japanese military capabilities and roles, in particular, for the larger U.S.-China relationship and Taiwan’s security. Enhancements in the U.S.-Japan security alliance and changes in the larger U.S. military posture in maritime Asia, South Korea, Australia, and some key Southeast Asian will influence the overall regional security environment in the Asian-Pacific region.

The weakening of the U.S. alliance system is also something to take into account and ought to be a matter of considerable concern to Washington policy makers. The U.S.-ROK alliance is under even greater strain. The U.S.-ROK alliance contributes heavily to regional stability and as long as it is not seen as threatening to China, will be viewed in Beijing as contributing to the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula. But an event around the Korean peninsula escalates, particularly the Sino-Taiwan conflict, the U.S-ROK military alliance will enter into the Taiwan Strait and insist on the Chinese military from Yellow Sea supporting Taiwan.

China and Central Asia have proposed multiple pipeline routes that utilize the existing and proposed infrastructure. One example of this is an existing northbound pipeline from Central Asia to South Korea and Japan, connecting Central Asian oil and gas with Eastern Asian countries, although these pipelines transverse China’s territory and were developed in conjunction with the Chinese government. These routes include the Far East export route from Russia to Japan and Korea. As a strategic partner with China, Russia now plays an important role in Asia-Pacific regional security matters after Medvegev took office in Kremlin. At present, Central Asia exports most of their natural gas via the Central Asia-China pipeline. Since large sections of the pipelines connecting the Central Asian Region to China and to Eastern Asian markets, China indeed controls the economic stability of countries of the Eastern Asian region; thus directing the development of their foreign policies. This shows us that China and Russia may together use an energy transit route to influence the economies of Japan and South Korea. Of course, China can also use other economic factors such as sanctions on Japanese and South Korean companies in internal Chinese markets and goods exports. This would restrict Japan and South Korea if they become involved in a Sino-Taiwan war. Therefore, the SOC has recently become a vehicle for geopolitical posturing and has been involved in several, less than subtle moves against U.S. interest.

There is little doubt that the United States should strive to enhance its involvement in regional multilateral security interactions, improve relations with India and Vietnam, and continue to deepen its security alliance with Australia in order to maintain strong and credible deterrents toward China over Taiwan.

The third category of Asian security cooperation is a group of ad hoc functional mechanisms. Unlike the institutions and open-ended dialogue processes, these mechanisms focus on one issue area or attempt to resolve a particular crisis, for example; the six-party talks for resolving the Korean peninsula problem, counterterrorism as well as transnational crime. But there is no effective
security mechanism that focuses on Taiwan issues in the Asian-Pacific region, as well as around world, because the People’s Republic of China is determined to maintain Taiwan issues within the framework of internal Chinese affairs.

Nascent security multilateralism exists in the Asian-Pacific Region, including the ARF (ASEAN regional forum), APEC and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The purpose of ARF was to shape the security policies of the major powers, primarily by locking in U.S. interests in Asia at a time when Washington’s commitment to the region was in doubt, and to draw an emerging China into a regional multilateral process. ARF is unable to discuss several of the region’s most significant security issues, most notably Taiwan; even through ARF is the most expansive multilateral security institution within Asia.\(^{31}\) The SAARC members are interested in addressing SAARC’s shortcomings, but disputes continue to limit regional cooperation despite efforts to excise contentious areas from discussion, and present contributions to security are minimal.\(^{32}\)

The perception of China’s ever growing power in the region serves to encourage the nations on China’s periphery to remain on good terms with Beijing even as they also seek some balancing presence from the United States (and perhaps Japan) across the spectrum of national power-economics, politics, and the military. ASEAN remains largely unable to take unified stances on a variety of issues, given the often diverging interests of its members.

China’s strategy in multilateral institutions has also been quite effective in its goal of marginalizing Taiwan. In virtually all of the regional organizations of which it is a part, China has successfully prevented Taiwan from participation. Taiwan is not a member of the APT, ARF, EAS, Six-Party Talks, or the SCO. China has more difficulty exercising such control over the membership of global institutions. Taiwan is a member, for example, of the World Trade Organization. Preventing Taiwan access to these institutions allows China to stop Taiwan from building its international position without getting into diplomatic spats like the one it had with Singapore in June 2005 (see above). In other words, this strategy allows China to marginalize Taiwan without unduly worrying the rest of Asia.\(^{33}\)

Immediately following the November 2004 U.S. presidential election, vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michael Ying-mao Kau, stated that while tension would continue across the Strait, he foresaw ‘no cross-strait war’. He continued to note that only the United States is qualified to intervene in the cross-strait situation.\(^{34}\) Therefore, in the Asian-Pacific region there is no corrective security mechanism such as NATO in Europe, and most of the Asian-Pacific countries do not want to infuriate the PRC by getting involved in a Sino-Taiwan War. Thus the position of the U.S. will play a major role in determining the end results of a Sino-Taiwan war.

The Alternative approach of the U.S.A to a Sino-Taiwan War scenario

In the event of a military confrontation between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, will the United States attack China’s forward air and missile bases in order to degrade Beijing’s offensive capabilities and achieve air superiority? If China does attack Taiwan, will the United States immediately and successfully intervene?

First of all, let us look back at the reaction of the U.S. to the Russian-Georgian war. During the Russian-Georgian war, the U.S. practiced rather restrained policy and left shuttle diplomacy. The U.S. was the central mediating role through the U.S. troops who flew Georgian contingents back from Iraq and supplied humanitarian aid by sea. After the war the Bush administration provided financial and economic support, but there is no publicly available evidence that the Georgian leadership expectation of broader military support was fulfilled. Obviously, the U.S. could not provide military support to build Georgia’s defense against Russia.

Related the PRC and Taiwan issue, Beijing wanted a relationship with the US separate from that with Taiwan, which it described as an “internal Chinese matter, in which the U.S. government has no right to interfere, nor has it any right to request us not to use force”. Actually, this was an unattainable objective and in 2005 the US remains the Taiwan military’s only source of assistance in a world that refuses to recognize the nation it serves. In addition is the importance of Washington’s cooperation with Beijing in international affairs; ranging from trade issues to the war on terrorism to the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula. The enormous economic links between the United States and China are a significant factor in the triangular relationship between PRC, Taiwan and the U.S. Americans might also wonder how much Taipei values when Taiwan’s economy is becoming increasingly interdependent with the Chinese mainland.

Moreover, Seventh Fleet units may face significant tactical difficulties if ordered into a Taiwan scenario. The time-distance problem is noteworthy. If Beijing correctly deployed thirty submarines from homeport, and then maintained just twelve of them on station for thirty to sixty days, U.S. naval forces would have to transit the East China Sea with great caution. Locating a dozen or two submarines with possible hostile intent is a difficult task. If BJ were willing to accept an element of risk, a PLAN submarine or two could even be stationed in the vicinity of the channels into Tokyo Wan, the Sasebo naval magazine complex, or near White Beach in Okinawa - all locations common to U.S. ship transits.

Indeed, most seem to believe it is a US obligation to intervene, no matter what the Taiwan government does or does not do. But from all of the documents and statements, only the TRA (Taiwan Relations Act) carries the force of U.S. law. While it does not pledge US military assistance to Taiwan’s defense, it does in effect guarantee that any unprovoked Chinese recourse to military (or

---


economic) force against the island would be met by US intervention.\textsuperscript{37} While the TRA (Taiwan Relations Act) does not dictate American intervention to prevent non-peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, it certainly implies that role.

Moreover from historical views, U.S. interventions during the past forty years were marked by inconsistent performances during several crises. Taipei’s core military strategy was based on a return to the mainland throughout much of this period. Washington simply never believed this goal was achievable and hence, US military support for Taiwan during the Cold War was based on a fundamentally different strategic view from that of Taipei’s. For the United States, maintaining a Taiwan’s nationalist regime was a minor campaign in the war against international communism. And the United States has never been willing to wage major warfare on the Chinese mainland.

Accurately judging the American reaction to use active military force, China did not, during any of the strait crises of 1954, 1958, 1962, and 1995-1996, intend either to invade Taiwan or engage US forces. This was not necessarily known at the time by Taipei or Washington, and China misjudged the American reaction in every one of those instances.

Deciding to intervene in a Taiwan scenario would still pose difficult issues for any American president. This is because Washington’s post-September 11, ‘global war on terror’ agenda continues to place very heavy demands on U. S. military resources in areas far from the Taiwan theater. U.S. commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere as well as the global war on terrorism has severely impacted U.S. military resources worldwide, including those in the Pacific theater, as units from all the services are redeployed in normal cycles to the Middle East, Southwest Asia and the Korean Peninsula. This will possibly cause a lack of ships, aircraft, and precision-guided munitions with which to intervene.

During the non reality of military intervention of an Asian-Pacific regional alliance, significant US military intervention in a Taiwan scenario will require the transfer of forces from other commitments around the world. Furthermore, the cost of these conflicts will extend well beyond actual combat, as the United States will require significant time and money to restore its military weapons supplies and manpower from the European security commitment. In this case, the U.S.A will have to change its global military deployment.

Furthermore, U.S. military intervention faces time-distance constraints; delays incurred by U.S. naval forces dispatched to Taiwan. Aircraft carriers would be able to launch aircraft while several hundred miles from Taiwan, but imaginative employment of its submarines by Beijing could slow the carriers’ arrival at even those distances. Presumably, U.S. air forces stationed in Korea, Japan and on Guam could intervene almost immediately, but their effectiveness would be reduced by the distances they would have to fly to reach the scene of action.

As demonstrated above, the willingness of U.S. allies in East Asia to support military

\textsuperscript{37} Frequent American citing of this legal requirement may have played a role in Beijing’s passage of the Anti-Secession Law in February 2005 declaring Taiwan’s secession from the PRC to be illegal, although the major motivation for the new law was likely the evolution of what Beijing perceived to be independence-oriented developments in Taiwan in 2003-2004.
intervention is expected. U.S. military action in the Taiwan Strait area would be difficult without Tokyo’s full cooperation, including the use of Japanese bases, especially Okinawa. No U.S. allies advocate military support of Taiwan’s de facto, however, a minimum level of support is likely to be forthcoming from Japan and Australia, but the real substance of those activities would be directed to support the United States, not Taiwan. The response by American allies would be more robust in the unlikely event of an unprovoked attack by the PRC against Taiwan.

In 2000, Guam also became the first installation outside the U.S.A. to store long range air-launched cruise missiles, which are now easily accessible and forward deployed in the event of a future conflict in the Asian-Pacific region. From a U.S.A. force perspective, these aircraft are in the Pacific region not only as possible contingencies in multiple areas, but also for a possible Taiwan conflict. U.S. military deployments to Guam are beneficial to Taiwan, as these aircraft deployments take 3 hours to arrive in Taiwan, along with other U.S. Navy and Army deployments. This will cause Guam to become the most important strategic forward base for the U.S. military to directly threaten the Western Pacific, and especially to deter China.

The domestic political environment in the United States will affect the decision to intervene and the strength of intervention. Both the legislative and executive branches, irrespective of party, strongly support Taiwan democracy, but will be hesitant to commit US troops to the defense of a semi-ally, especially if Taipei is perceived as not doing all it should to build its own defense. In this case, the U.S. with Taiwan will reach first step military priority. Even if U.S. support is forthcoming Taiwan’s defensive capability requires the island to be capable of defending itself against the PLA for at least long enough to permit the U.S. to bring in overwhelming forces to intervene. Therefore, the most realistic strategic estimate of the United State’s position is the factor of how many times the American people will support a Washington decision to intervene in this conflict. Washington may not be able to justify continued intervention, especially during a continuing ‘global war on terror’. Furthermore, reiterative Chinese campaigns against Taiwan may differ both in scope and character.

Furthermore, there seems to be a persistent belief that the United States will not persevere in the face of casualties. This belief is based mostly on the withdrawal from Somalia in 1993, and more recently, military withdrawal from Iraq as well as from Afghanistan in 2011. This belief prevails despite the contravening evidence of American willingness to stay the course for nine years in Vietnam. Taiwan’s democracy is important to the United States, but sending young Americans to die for it may not be supported. A September 2004 poll showed only 33 percent of U.S. respondents support committing American troops to Taiwan’s defense, while a January 2005 poll indicated only 25 percent of Americans would support using U.S. military power to defend Taiwan. A similar lack of enthusiasm may exist in Congress.

---

We can consider that the U.S. is prepared to assist Taiwan against PRC attack. Taiwan is an indispensable partner for Washington, and invoked the first island chain, a strategic construct that originated in China. On the other hand, there are a number of factors lacking in U.S. support of Taiwan. These include: the lack of formal recognition of Taiwan; the few American experts available in Taipei and Washington to address the issues; the resources demands of the global war on terrorism and the U.S.A. global strategy; the U.S. priority on maintaining good relations with the PRC; and the reservations toward American Taiwan policy by its most important Asian allies, Australia, Japan, and Singapore. These all restrict U.S. options in the cross-strait situation.

American troops had withdrawn after 1972 from Taiwan; however since then there has been soft American military assistance to Taiwan. Technical assistance and logistical support has accompanied virtually all material assistance. Since 1979, that role has been played by the much smaller Technical Assistance Group, consisting of less than a dozen retired U.S. military personnel, stationed at the American Institute in Taiwan; the unofficial U.S. representative office in Taipei. Washington should reduce American’s risk exposure by making it clear that the United States would not intervene in a PRC-Taiwanese struggle. The only politically feasible way of doing that, however, would be for Washington to liberalize its arms export policy and allow Taiwan to buy the weapons it needs to become and remain militarily self-sufficient.39

The U.S. changed its policy of weapon aid and has started to sell the weapons to Taiwan. The shopping list approved by President George W. Bush in April 2001 was the most dramatic offering since his father authorized the F-16 sale in 1992. The importance of high technology weapons is such that at the beginning of 2010, Taiwan had shipped a series of attack weapons from the U.S. Taiwan’s military equipment comes almost completely from U.S. sales or designs. Therefore, we can consider the U.S.A.’s attitude to Taiwan military assistance has gradually changed and reduced, and Taipei’s defense policies are influenced - perhaps even driven - by U.S. attitudes and policies.

The United States has also provided Taiwan with training assistance team visits and other advice. Particularly in the areas of joint operations, air defense doctrine, missile defense, information warfare, modeling and simulation for war gaming and logistics management. The U.S. National Defense University has established an agreement with Taiwan’s NDU for the exchange of students, faculty and annual strategic discussions.

U.S. assistance to Taiwan is vital but limited, because of the three communiqués between the United States and China-1972, 1978 and 1982. American support for Taiwan was hedged by adherence to a one China policy expressed in the 1982 language in which Washington stated that it had no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan.40

As with the attitude to the Russian-Georgian war, the U.S. military and their Allies had

demonstrated a threat to Russia Naval in the Black Sea strait, but actually, they did not do anything to support Georgia in terms of military force. It is possible that the U.S. and their allies will only give political and material aid to support Taiwan and accuse China of attacking Taiwan, but actually they cannot set up a fire attack on the PLA.

The United States is attempting to steer a difficult path between not allowing a communist China mainland to overpower the democratic society of Taiwan, while simultaneously not allowing that democracy to be dragged into a war with a nuclear-armed China. This is because approximately 30 countries currently depend on U.S nuclear guarantees; 41 of those countries include the other 25 members of NATO, and countries such as Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROP) which have explicit nuclear security commitments. Others, such as Australia, Israel, and possibly Taiwan have more general security commitments of various forms in which nuclear guarantee are not explicit, but are implied in a general statement of U.S. protection. In late 2008, media reports stated that the Obama administration would consider making explicit a U.S. nuclear guarantee to Israel in response to the threat from a nuclear-armed Iran. However it is likely that Washington would not employ nuclear weapons, because the U.S. authority never officially stated the making of an explicit U.S. nuclear guarantee with Taiwan.

Taiwan’s primary strategic objective is to resist an initial PRC employed military attack on Taiwan. The historical background of the military, marked by ideological dedication and relative oneness with the governing regime, has come up against a reality of political heterodoxy and a new relationship with its governmental masters. The Taiwan military’s inability to prevail against the PRC military over the long term has been without significant assistance from the United States or other allies. There is an increasing frustration among senior Taiwan military leaders, arising from a perceived lack of the resources required to defend Taiwan, a frustration probably sensed throughout the ranks.

Many in China believe the United States wants to use Taiwan to hem in China’s naval forces and even to use the island, eventually, as a base of military operations against the mainland; effectively using Taiwan as a strategic buffer against pressure from the east shore of China. Consequences of Sino-Taiwan Assumption War and potential implications will reshape the development of the Asian Security architecture and geopolitical situation.

**Conclusion and the geopolitical implications:**

After the Russian-Georgian War, Russia changed its stand in the Caucasus region and has determined the geopolitical transition in the post-Soviet region. In particular, Russia has successfully established missile bases in South Ossetia to protect its interests in the Caucasus and Black Sea region. In July 2010, Russia had already established a S-300 air defense missile system in

---

the Abkhaz region to retaliate against the U.S. missile system in Eastern Europe.

Similarly, to defend its maritime sovereignty and interests, change own sea dilemma in the Pacific-Asian region when the U.S.A. organized with Japan and South Korea a series of strategic military maneuvers to shoot missiles in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, most Chinese experts have considered these military maneuvers as addressing the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the U.S.A. with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand and India hold strategic military cooperation to block Chinese geopolitical security. Obviously, the U.S.A’s strategic naval invasion in the South China Sea drew Vietnam to the Alliance against the PRC. Therefore, China absolutely needs strategic naval bases beyond China’s mainland. Taiwan is the best choice, due to the fact that the PRC has always declared Taiwan as part of China’s territory.

With the framework state territory integrity and sovereignty, China can unify Taiwan through any means; either peacefully or militarily. But if the U.S.A and their international allies interfere, they will violate international law and the law of the United Nations. Whether or not the U.S.A will get involved in a China-Taiwan war scenario, world order and the Asian-Pacific regional political-security order will face serious challenges. If the U.S.A prevents the island from being used as a strategic asset by antagonists to attack or contain the mainland, the result of the war will be assessed in a different way, and the Asian-Pacific geopolitical situation will face a historical transition.

If the PRC succeeds in its attempt to bring Taiwan back into the state in such a short time, the PLA would have need to have a strong argument to settle and change the ‘sea disadvantage’. This is needed to establish China’s maritime priority in the Asian-Pacific region, consolidate territorial sovereignty and boundary security, and develop China’s influence in the Asian-Pacific region. Consequently, it will also produce very serious negative influences on Asian allies of the U.S.A. The U.S. have to produce a strategic contraction in the Asian-Pacific region, gradually squeezed out from South China Sea and East Sea, in order that world-wide multi-polarity power can be realized.

Given present trends in China and Taiwan, only successful U.S. intervention could alter the military calculus. The entry of the United States would of course tilt the balance of military power in Taiwan’s favor. If the U.S. with Taiwan reach ‘first step’ military priority, the violence similar to what was seen in the color revolution in the post-Soviet region will happen in China’s borderlands: Xinjian, Tibet and internal Mongolia. But what is not expected to happen is a collapse similar to the break of the SSRS, because the external crisis will attrite any internal crisis. An anti-U.S. atmosphere will consolidate social and political solidarity internally within the PRC. Indeed how many times will the American people support a Washington decision to intervene in this conflict? And how long sitzkrieg between the PRC and the U.S. in a Taiwan conflict? In the 1960’s, during the years of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian boundary conflict, the PLA and Japanese military ‘seesaw battle’ on China’s mainland during WWII, and the gradual withdrawal of U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, all provide very clear evidences for the final conclusion and reaction of U.S to the
Virtual Sino-Taiwan warfare Scenario. The 2008 Russian-Georgian War defined the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus as the Western confrontation line of Cold War, obviously, the Sino-Taiwan War will define the geopolitical transition in the Asian-Pacific Region as the Eastern confrontation line of the Cold War, as well as will reshape the new Asian-Pacific security mechanism. If the Nuclear Weapon will employ during the Sino-Taiwan War, the geopolitical consequences and the implications of war will re-asses in other ways.