Transformation of Russia-Kazakhstan Post-Soviet Political Relations: from Chaos to Integration?¹

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ABSTRACT This paper reviews the transformation of political relations between the two largest states in the former USSR, Russia and Kazakhstan during the years from 1991 to 2008 with an emphasis on Russian Foreign policy and interests. The focus is on political relations as reflected in the unprecedented intensity of bilateral meetings and agreements in this area. Two different periods, those of the Yeltsin and Putin’s presidencies are distinguished. Different stages and general “peaks” and “troughs” in relations of these two states are also analysed. The most important trends and bilateral agreements from the more than 400 agreements between the countries are outlined, and their role in strategic bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation is considered.

INTRODUCTION

The role of Russia-Kazakhstan relations has been increasing as a priority in Russian foreign policy. In fact, the first international visit of the new Russian president Medvedev to Astana was intended to mark a new stage in Russia-Kazakhstan bilateral relations; hence it is important to evaluate past relations and to determine key elements of transformation in the bilateral relationship between the two largest post-Soviet countries.

According to the opinion of Kazakhstan’s president, N. Nazarbayev, who has been in power from the very beginning of Kazakhstan’s independence in 1991 “all the problematic issues between Kazakhstan and Russia have been resolved through constructive dialogue and considerations of mutual interests; and this refers both to political and economic areas” (Kazakhstan’s Embassy in Russia 2009:12).

However, the collapse of the USSR inevitably posed several problems of dividing once united economies and societies, further discussed in the paper. The role of political relations in maintaining stable and positive cooperation in economic and social spheres

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shouldn’t be underestimated. Russian foreign policy to the CIS countries and to Kazakhstan in particular, has changed considerably since independence [1]. Though there has been research conducted on the role of Russia in Central Asia, the issues of Russian-Kazakhstan relations, following the collapse of the former USSR, have not been researched in depth. It is especially important to conduct such research as the nature of these relations in the political area is in the process of transformation from finding basic legislative frameworks to strategic programs for long-term cooperation. In addition, unresolved disputes and problems tend to complicate bilateral relations, while the best solution would be to take into account existing gaps in the transformation of bilateral relations.

While this paper focuses on contemporary trends, one should note considerable influence of the relations, preceding the collapse of the USSR. This should include not only relations during the Soviet period (Olcott 1992:111), but previous long-term historical trends between Russia and Kazakhstan [2]. These historical aspects of bilateral relations inevitably have a strong impact on the contemporary decision-making process, and will be also shaping future trends in relations (Litvinov 2010).

1. STAGES OF RELATIONS
1.1. EXISTING THEORETICAL APPROACHES

In general, it is possible to refer to the two key stages in Kazakhstan-Russian bilateral relations, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These stages are influenced to a considerable extent by different foreign policies conducted during Yeltsin’s and Putin’s presidencies. Mikhail Alexandrov (1999), in his book about Kazakhstan-Russian relations during 1991-1997, referred to it as to the “uneasy alliance”; and this reference has also been applicable during later periods of bilateral relations. There were no crises in the diplomatic relations between the states; and, in general, political relations between Kazakhstan and Russian have always (at least officially) been very stable. However, during both Yeltsin’s and Putin’s presidencies there were different sub-stages of relations, the lines of which could be different upon considerations of different areas of relations (political, military, economic, or cultural).

Putin officially proclaimed CIS to be the key priority in Russian foreign policy, in this changing previous priority in favour of the West (see section 2.2. of the paper on Putin’s policy). Nevertheless, there are not many Russian research reports published with a focus on Russian-Kazakhstan relations that would highlight and analyse different stages of the
relationship. This might be explained by the fact that Russian foreign policy towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia in general, following the collapse of the USSR, was not coherent, and such approach could pose many controversial questions.

There are a number of Kazakhstani works that analyse different stages of Kazakhstan-Russian relations. However, primarily they are based on three works; and these three works could be structured within the two approaches towards defining different stages in Russian-Kazakhstan relations. First approach was offered by T. A. Mansurov (2001), ex-Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Russia, and it mostly covers the first decade of the relations between the states. Despite the fact that this work is the first fundamental attempt to present a systematic approach towards different stages in bilateral relations; it covers neither aspects of long historic relations between the states and their influence on current trends, nor aspects of contemporary social cooperation between the countries. This typology was updated by the Kazakhstan’s Institute for Strategic Research (KISI)’ expert M. Laumilun (2009). While Laumilin reveals some problematic issues, existing between the states and researches them in greater depth, this work, nevertheless, has a tendency to express Kazakhstan’s official policy towards the relations.

These two approaches are similar in their interpretation of different periods in bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia:

1\textsuperscript{st} period - definition of the new legislative basis of relations;
2\textsuperscript{nd} period - search for the new model of relationships in political, economic and military areas;
3\textsuperscript{rd} period - widening and deepening bilateral cooperation within integration frameworks of the CIS;
4\textsuperscript{th} period - change in the cooperation format - from multi-lateral relations to bilateral relations (this stage has also created prerequisites to the future successful realization of the integration projects, according to the scholars).

Another typology offered is by Ye. Aben (2000) who studied only the first decade of bilateral relations. His approach is generally similar to the one, offered by T. Mansurov. However, the scholar specifies one additional period –years 1995-1998; pointing to the decline in relations during this period due to the intensification of the US-Kazakhstan’s relations. In addition, Ye. Aben defines the initial period as “non-systematic” and conflicting, and second period – by “Kazakhstan’s sole attempts to overcome conflicting relations with Russia”. According to the expert, these attempts “were expressed in the initiatives of
Kazakhstan’s president only, an apogee of which an idea of the Eurasian Union had become” (Aben 2000). However, in his typology a delimitation should be noted that the scholar had a tendency to focus on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, rather than on bilateral relations.

1.2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH APPLIED

In this paper I examine the role of Russian foreign policy in Russia-Kazakhstan relations, following the collapse of the USSR from 1991 to 2008. In this, different trends that influenced these relations during Yeltsin’s and Putin’s periods are distinguished.

Firstly, general bilateral political relations between Russia and Kazakhstan are analysed, based on political agreements, official visits and statements. In particular, data on the meetings between the presidents of the countries is considered (including both meetings during different summits, and separate-state visits. In addition to this, the initial analysis of political relations includes the data on the key factors in Russian foreign policy, Russian national policy, Kazakhstan’s policy and regional integration trends. This data is presented in chronological order in tables 1 and 2 (1-for the Yeltsin’s period and 2-for Putin’s period).

In order to analyse continuing political trends in depth, several other areas of bilateral relations are highlighted in table 1.2 and table 2.2. This extended comparison allows a more insightful examination of the factor of foreign policy in bilateral relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. In the table 1.2 different areas of relations are ranked according to the primary Russian strategic interests in relations with Kazakhstan under the presidency of Yeltsin. In the table 2.2 the focus is on economic trends mostly, as one of the most challenging aspects during the Putin’s presidency.

In the tables, difficult and controversial periods are marked in a darker colour, compared to more positive trends in relations. Events that lead to the intensification of Russian-Kazakhstan’s relations are highlighted in bold; while events that had a negative impact on bilateral relations are underlined. The delimitation here should be noted though, that such evaluations might be further distinguished as having different long-term and short-term impact for some of the events. The graph “general trends” (which includes political relationships) summarises the tables 1.2 and 2.2. While considering this data for the tables, and making estimations concerning the character of the bilateral relationships several sources were considered. Among these sources are mass media news reports, scholarly publications, Russian Embassy in Kazakhstan reports on bilateral relations, and interviews conducted
during my field research and conferences conducted at Russia, Kazakhstan, and the UK in 2010.

2. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TRANSFORMATIONS.

2.1. YELTSIN’S PERIOD: INDEPENDENCE FROM PREVIOUS TIES?

Russia maintained mostly stable political and diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan throughout both Yeltsin’s and Putin’s period. Only the initial period (end of 1991-beginning of 1992) could be characterized as a period of political confrontation (though mostly de facto); while in all the years following, both countries characterized political relations as very stable. Five periods in political relationships could be outlined during Yeltsin’s period: 1) the end of 1991- beginning of 1992 - period of political confrontation; 2) 1992-1993- “cold” de facto relations; 3) 1994-positive trends; 4) 1995-1996-“cold” de facto relations; 5) 1997-1999-positive trends in political relations [see table 1.1].

Based on the analysis conducted, it is argued that during Yeltsin’s period these periods were considerably influenced by the following Russian interests in Kazakhstan: 1) nuclear issues; 2) space agreements; 3) border issues; 4) military agreements (post-Soviet arsenal); 5) Russian Diaspora issues; 6) oil agreements (Caspian issue, and transit of Kazakhstan’s oil); 7) issues of economic cooperation [refer to the table 1.2 and further discussions of the key events in this regard].

At the very beginning of the new relations Russian ideological strategy had the critical role in the bilateral relations. In 1991, Kozyrev, the first post-Soviet Russia’s foreign minister, in Izvestia (one of the main newspapers), denied any Russian interests in Central Asia apart from issues, related to the national security (and these, he said, must be addressed in close coordination with Russian western partners). National security is a very complex notion; however, for Russia during that period with regards to Kazakhstan it was mostly related to military-related interests. Despite the absence of mutual agreements, Russia had been urgently moving ex-Soviet military arsenal from Kazakhstan to Russia. There were also contradictions over the Baykonur cosmodrome, which had been partially resolved only in 1994. However, the main controversy was related to the strategic nuclear forces, located in Kazakhstan. In fact, not until Kazakhstan accepted western financial assistance, and negotiated territorial integrity with Russia, had the Republic become de-facto non-nuclear state in 1995, passing an important stage in the bilateral relations.
Once the above outlined national security issues were resolved, a new more positive stage in political relations commenced between the countries. In fact, the year 1994 was marked by the first official visit of Kazakhstan’s president to Moscow. However, while political relations have been mostly very stable from that period, this could not be also projected towards the general relations between the countries. Starting from 1995 other aspects, rather than the military-related, had been changing the agenda of relations between the countries, and problematic issues were mostly not reflected in official political relations.

Firstly, the new Russian foreign policy to Kazakhstan was amended due to geopolitical aspects, related to the Caspian Sea region [3] (Bolukbasi 1998). Another issue was related to the inevitable questions of economic cooperation. Hence, in his presidential decree of 14 September 1995, Boris Yeltsin proclaimed the reintegration of post-Soviet space around Russia as the major foreign policy priority: “on the territory of the CIS our key basic interests are concentrated in the areas of economy, military defence, security, rights of the Russian citizens, maintaining of which is the key priority of our national security strategy” (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 1995). In fact, in 1998, the two countries signed a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Alliance. According to Russian experts, this new stage in the bilateral relations arose from the lobby of the Russian political class who wanted to compensate substantial loss of regional influence in the 1990s (Zvyagelskaya 2004). However, though the scope of Russian interests in the “near” abroad (Kozyrev 1992) has widened; its substantially weakened strategic positions had prevented success in regaining its previous power (Cummings 2001: 145).

Some political representatives considered the issue of border division as not favourable to Russia [notably, famous Russian writer Solzhenitsyn and Duma representative Zhirinovskii were expressing the opinion that the northern territories of Kazakhstan had always belonged to Russia]. While Russia never initiated the reconsideration of the border division, such claims inevitably put the border issue on the important agenda of Kazakhstan’s government. Tensions with Cossacks were also intensifying Kazakhstan’s concerns over the threat of the northern territory secession to Russia, as in these territories ethnically Russian population was the predominant one. In fact, though the relocation of the capital from Almaty (Alma-Ata) to Astana (Akmola) in 1995 minimized this threat; Kazakhstan had been still concerned over the possible Russian dominance through the huge Russian Diaspora and through the strategic for the Republic oil spear. Foreign Transnational corporations (TNC) had considerably shifted Russian presence in the oil area, as Kazakhstan proclaimed “multi-
vector” foreign policy. In addition, in general, Russian business circles were disappointed with the results of Kazakhstan’s privatization, which limited Russian capital investment in the Republic’s economy.

All the negotiations on the dual citizenship, initiated by Russia, for the Russian-speaking population failed. Unofficially, the explanation of this is well-known in the Republic: in this case, during that time, majority of Kazakhstan’s population would hold Russian citizenship, inevitably putting the national security at stake. In 1995, the Russian Duma tried to draw attention to several problems of the Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan. The hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations, reported by the Russian Federal Migration Service, included such issues as the de-russification trends in the Republic and violation of Russian-speaking populations’ rights (including in the new Kazakhstan’s constitution). These attempts to discuss problems of the largest post-Soviet Russian Diaspora abroad were not successful.

In general, Russian foreign policy did not set the tone for bilateral relations as a whole during Yeltsin’s presidency. Kazakhstan’s policy had a critical impact on bilateral relations during that period. In particular, in 1995-1998, Kazakhstan has intensified relations with the US, and this negatively influenced bilateral relations. The initial Russian political disengagement from Central Asia occurred for several reasons. This included internal restucturization and domestic rivalries. It was also rooted in the ideology of the newly formed Federation. Yeltsin’s government had to assure Russian population that the collapse of the USSR was necessary—despite the results of the referendum to keep it. New national approach at that time focused on Russia itself, and Central Asia was described as a burden, without which Russia would proceed more promptly.

This initial incoherent Russian foreign policy had also reflected the development of bilateral relations within different integration structures. CIS have been developing as a rhetorical structure, and already in 1992 Russia initiated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to resolve mutual security issues (it is important to note though that in 1999 several states-Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan- withdraw from the organization). In the economic area it is even possible to argue open confrontation of the states on the regional integration arena during that period. Several Central Asian integration structures had emerged, in which both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were putting efforts to become central players. Moreover, Nazarbayev’s initiative - further framed as a concept- for Eurasian Union was met with the cold reaction in Russia. This, among other reasons, was due to the new
voting principle offered that would lead to the new one, distribution of power, not favorable to Russia. In addition, though it is widely acknowledged that Nazarbayev presented his concept for the first time in the MGU[Moscow State University], in was actually announced at the Chatham house, UK, and was perceived in Russia as a program targeted for the western partners instead of the CIS countries themselves (Alexandrov 1997: 175). Hence, Russia has been considerably more interested in another economic organization- Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), through which progress was further reached on cooperation in custom’s area.

2.2 PUTIN’S PERIOD: RE-THINKING NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES

The second stage in Russian- Kazakhstan relations has seen significant changes due to the further increased emphasis paid by Russia to cooperation with the CIS. In the first months after Putin’s election three key doctrinal documents, defining future Russian foreign and security policy, were adopted: the National Security Concept (10 January 2000), the Military Doctrine (21 April 2000), and the Foreign Policy Concept (28 June 2000). As it was stated in the Russian federation foreign policy concept (2000) “certain plans related to establishing new, equitable and mutually advantageous partnership relations of Russia with the rest of the world, as was assumed in the Basic principles of the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation (endorsed by Directive of the Russian President in April, 1993), and in other documents have not been justified”. Hence, these international realities prompted Russia to redefine its policy:

“IV. Regional priorities.
A priority area in Russia's foreign policy is ensuring conformity of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to national security tasks of the country.
Proceeding from the concept of different-speed and different-level integration within the CIS framework, Russia will determine the parameters and character of its interaction with CIS member states both in the CIS as a whole and in narrower associations, primarily the Customs Union and the Collective Security Treaty”. (Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept 2000).
This new Russian foreign policy was also reflected in the number of scholarly publications. Some Russian scholars outlined, that Russia needed to use favourable prices on energy resources in order to regain the position of the global superpower. In particular, A. Dugin was appealing to stop being over concerned about using such terms as “revenge”, “imperia”, or “national mission”. Russia has been regaining its economic power; and this facilitated the shift of economic cooperation and geopolitical interests into the key state priorities in relations with Kazakhstan under Putin’s presidency [see also Table 2.2 for details on main trends in these areas]. Russia has also been putting emphasis on keeping strong political relations with Kazakhstan. In fact, during the second decade of independent relations considerable increase in official meeting of the presidents could be observed. Presidents were meeting more often not only during different sessions of the integration developments, but also during official visits.

In 2000-2001 -years and political relations between the countries were exceptionally strong, as Russia provided assistance to Central Asia (and Kazakhstan, in particular) related to the security area. During that period the security situation in the region became very unstable due to the threats from Afghanistan, and the instability in the region. In general, the role of cooperation in security received an important emphasis in the policy of both countries, and in this has always been reflected in the official documents and speeches, preceding and following official state visits [4].

Despite the fact that general political relations between the countries during the Putin’s presidency were stable; there have been periodically tensions over the Caspian Sea oil projects and this was reflected on general relations between the countries. In January 2004, Putin was trying to strengthen Russian positions with regards to the “lost” areas on a more favourable to Russia conditions. In particular, issues of “Baikonur, military and technical cooperation, Caspian Sea, synchronization of economic reforms, relations with the West [and the NATO], and transport infrastructure” were discussed (Manasheva 2006). However, Kazakhstan’s reaction through mass media had considerable resonance and negative reaction on this attempt.

Kazakhstan have always been interested in cooperation with Russia; however on conditions that Russia would be among the other leading powers and the Republic’s own strategy would be pursued through balancing foreign presence in the state. The next 2005 year was marked by unprecedented activity in political relations between the countries. Russia signed the border agreement with Kazakhstan, which had considerable importance for
the Republic. In his Address to the Nation (2005), the president stated that “for the first time in [Kazakhstan’s] history [its people] have received jurisdictionally defined state border with Russia”. Starting from this period Kazakhstan has changed its investment policy towards increasing outward financial flows to Russia. In addition, many scholars argue that Russia has started to invest considerably more in Central Asia and in Kazakhstan through off-shore investments (Libman and Heifets 2006). In this year, chief editor of the Russian journal «Finans» Anisimov, referring to the sourced in Kremlin, had even published controversial article «Kazakh Rus», in which the allegedly secret Moscow plans on creation of a single state Russia and Kazakhstan were revealed. It has sense to note that during this period the US-Kazakhstani relations had deteriorated and “the US State Department has transferred Central Asia from European to Asian and Middle Eastern sub-departments, de facto acknowledging approach “democracy in exchange of power’ to the region” (Laumulin 2009: 12). Much to these new political relations changes of Kazakhstan’s investment policy were contributed-as the Republic’s government has changed the policy of maintaining highly preferential investment incentives to the foreign companies (including American).

The current MFA, assessing the results of Putin’s years, has stated that amongst key achievements of the state during these years, the re-gained ability to conduct independent foreign policy can be underlined. Many Russian experts though express criticism about Russian success in the CIS, and in Central Asia, in particular. Among the areas in which Russia is believed to fail in achieving its key goals in Kazakhstan during Putin’s presidency-CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) and Baykonur-related cooperation are stressed. Putin is blamed Putin for rhetorical political statements, that didn’t move Russia closer to the epicentre of the post-Soviet regionalism, compared to 1990th, but rather moved further away. Russian experts have been concerned with the new appearing regional initiatives. These scepticism has been related not only organizations, not involving Russia; but also attitude towards, for example, such new structures as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been also somewhat divided. Many official Russian representatives stress that “the aim of the CSO is cooperation, not integration” [5]- due to “many controversial issues in relations with China”, one of the key members in the new organization (Kurtov 2010).

Kazakhstan itself has been aimed to become the new regional power, competing in this way with Russia in the regional frameworks. Contrary to Russia it does not favour the CIS region in its foreign policy strategy. Not only the concept of Eurasian Union and remaining disagreements over the Caspian Sea projects has been raising controversy, but also
the competing interests in establishing regional financial centres in Moscow and in Almaty.
Following 2005, Kazakhstan, apart of Russia [6], has started to invest in other post-Soviet
states (Georgia in particular); and expressed interests in Belorussian projects during the
period of disagreements between the states.

Despite all the mutual official intentions to strengthen cooperation through regional
cooperation, these attempts have not been fruitful. Meanwhile, the progress is reached
through specific narrow agreements in this regards- apart of the previously mentioned
Custom’s Union, projects of the purposefully established in 2005 inter-state Eurasian Bank
for Development (EBB) could be outlined as an example in this regard [7].

CONCLUSION

Officially, political relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been very stable.
Since the collapse of the USSR, more than 400 bilateral agreements have been signed
between the states, following regular political meetings. Nevertheless, there are still a number
of issues that require further discussions (among them are the final division of the Caspian
Sea and the eroding Russian Diaspora).

While initially Russia’s foreign policy was targeted towards defining its own
independent role, and stronger intensification of relations with the West, the former Central
Asian Republic was not in the focus of the Federation’s Foreign Policy. However, once
Russia has been re-gaining economic power, the scope and priorities of its strategic interests
have been changing.

It is widely believed that Russia’s long-term strategic goals are focused on the
maximum integration of the states, including economy, military areas, and even transition to
a single currency (Laumulin 2009; Cummings 2001; Buszynski 2005; etc.). While such a full
integration does not seem to reflect Russian interests entirely; Russia apparently has strong
intentions to intensify cooperation between the countries.

However, the initial incoherent Russian policy affected general trends in bilateral
relations, and had its impact for the future developments of bilateral relations. The Federation
has also lost its authority in the regional integration structures and processes. In addition, it is
important to outline that Kazakhstan itself is on track to play a larger role in the regional
integration trends, competing in this way with Russia.
Hence, now, when the euphoria of independence is past, the countries have been in the process of re-shaping their strategic aims towards each other; and the goals of partnership coexist with an increased competition. This complicated the processes of multilateral regionalism, mostly minimizing successful cooperation on a narrow bilateral level.

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NOTES

1. As for Russian academic and leading intellectual approaches itself - during the first years of independence, when Russia had been forming its own new foreign policy and its own theoretical “mainstream” in international relations, there were vast debates among eurasianists and westernists, democrats and “derzhavniki”, ethonationalists and those who support civil identity (Kokoshin, Bogaturov, et al. 2004).
2. In the 17th century, two of three Kazakh khans, being threatened by invasion of Jungars and Mongolian tribes, appealed to Russia for the help and protection. Russia, considering that these “buffer” zone would be in the Empire’s national security interest, in return, had agreed on a protectorate role for Kazakhstan.
3. Negotiations related to the demarcation of the Caspian Sea have been going on for nearly a decade among the states bordering the Caspian - Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. There are several key areas of concern, related the Caspian Sea status: access to mineral resources (oil and natural gas), access for fishing (and the population of caviars dropped in four times already, following implementation of the new oil projects), access to international waters (through Russia's Volga river and the canals connecting it to the Black Sea and Baltic Sea). Environmental issues are also connected to the status and borders issue. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan stand for dividing the Caspian Sea on the middle zone. Russia and Iran dispute 12 mile zone to each country, and the common rights for the remaining part (according to the agreement from 1940, between Russia and
Iran). Russian experts believe that these estimations are overestimated in four times-so to transform geopolitical aspects into economic ones (see also, among other publications, Blank 2006).

4. In fact, in April of 2010, the head of the CSTO, Nikolai Borduzha, during the MGIMO Diplomatic Module (14 April 2010, Moscow) on my question stated that there had been no contradiction between RF and RK in the military and security areas.

5 Author’s interview with Dmitrii Trofimov, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April, 15, 2010, Moscow.

6. In this regard Gulnara Musina, Managing Director of one of the largest Kazakhstan’s private banks-the Eurasian Bank, stressed that “Russia is a strategically important market for Kazakhstan” [Author’s interview, June 4, 2010, Almaty].

7. EABR representatives emphasise that this initiative is a truly mutual one. It is pointed out that in 2010; there were more than 34 large promising projects under implementation” [Evgenii Vinokurov, EABR, Author’s interview, June, 15, 2010, Almaty].

8. This document maintains legislative basis for cooperation in exploring North of the Caspian Sea, and, in particular, long-disputed "Kurmangazi", "Tsentralnoe" и "Khvalinskoyie" oil fields. According to the agreement signed, Russian and Kazakhstan’s shares were agreed to be equal to ½.

Table 1

Main events in Russian-Kazakhstan’s relations during 1991-1999
(Yeltsin’s presidency)

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<td>&quot;Strategic course on cooperation with the CIS&quot;</td>
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<td>Radical economic reforms; hyper-inflation; constitutional crisis; Presidential decree on Cossacks</td>
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<td>Duma’s hearings on violation of rights of Russian-speaking population in Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>President elections</td>
<td>Cossacks were deployed in the border security checking in Russia</td>
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<td>2nd Chechen war; Yeltsin’s resignatio n from power.</td>
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| Political trends | 3(1); 6 (4) | 3(1) | 4(3); 1st official visit of the Kz President | 3 (2) | 7(5) | 4(2) | 5(4) | 3 (2) |

| Meetings of the Presidents | Treaty on Friendship | Declaration on intensifying | Treaty on citizenship | Yeltsin was | Declaratio n "On |

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Table 1.2. General trends

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<th>Nuclear issue</th>
<th>Oil agreements</th>
<th>Economic cooperation</th>
<th>General trends</th>
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| Uranium disagreements | Kazakhstan became de-facto non-nuclear state | Lease agreement on Space Launch Station “Baikonur” | |}

Table 2

Main events in Russian-Kazakhstan’s relations during 2000-2008

(Putin’s presidency)

Table 2.1. Political relationships
Moscow (no serious consequences for the relations).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political trends</th>
<th>Year of Kazakhstan in Russia</th>
<th>Year of Russia in Kazakhstan</th>
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<th>2. Main political agreements</th>
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<th>Kazakhstan’s policy</th>
<th>Security threats from Afghanistan</th>
<th>Visit of John-Paul II</th>
<th>Washington granted Kazakhstan’s economy the status of the market economy</th>
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<tr>
<th>Integration trends</th>
<th>EvrAzYeS-October</th>
<th>CSTO - EAE - SCO</th>
<th>CSTO; EvrAzYeS; CICA; SCO: CICA - Single Economic area.</th>
<th>CACO-EurAsEC; Turkmenistan’s new policy</th>
<th>The Eurasian Bank of Development (EABR)</th>
<th>Custom’s Union</th>
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<th>Integrations</th>
<th>Economic cooperation</th>
<th>Oil agreements</th>
<th>General trends</th>
<th>Statements</th>
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<th>Table 2.2. Economic and general trends in bilateral relations</th>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Economic cooperation</th>
<th>Oil agreements</th>
<th>General trends</th>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>GazProm and KazMunaiGaz agreed to establish JV KazRosGas</td>
<td>CPC for the first time loaded crude oil.</td>
<td>First stage of the CPC pipeline system has started its realization</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Announcement construction of Balhash atomic electro-station;</td>
<td>Final agreement on delimitation of the seabed of the Northern Part of the Caspian Sea ‘agreement on transit of oil through Atiray-Novorossiysk pipeline.[8].</td>
<td>Lukoil and KazMuniaG as agreement on exploitation of the Northern Caspian Sea</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>Kurmangazi oil project (by Rosneft and KazMuniaG as)</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>2006-2008</td>
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