In the past decade, the Middle East has again become a Russian foreign policy priority – reversing Moscow’s reduced focus on the region from the 1970s, when the United States took on the dominant external role. This renewed interest was a result of growing
tensions between Russia and the West from the mid-2000s and the Arab Uprisings of 2011, which led to the Syrian civil war. The Russian military intervened in Syria in 2015 to support Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s dictator; this deployment of hard power has received comprehensive analysis, much of it critical, particularly from Western governments. However, Russia’s use of non-traditional methods of statecraft -- aimed at supplementing its military strategy, countering international and potential domestic criticism of its intervention, and advancing its interests in other parts of the Middle East -- has been less closely examined. This non-traditional statecraft includes the use of mercenaries in Syria, Libya, Sudan, and elsewhere. It is also evident in sophisticated influence-building techniques, and use of cyber technology aimed at shaping the views of governments and the public in the Middle East. These methodologies have also been on display during Russia’s war in Ukraine this year. This paper outlines the augmentation of Russia’s traditional diplomatic and military capabilities through deployment of non-traditional statecraft to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. It assesses Russia’s foreign policy successes to date and Russia’s likely use of this hybrid strategy in the future.