Prof. Bob Bowker was recently interviewed by Nozhan Etezadosaltaneh an Iranian journalist working for Shargh newspaper in Tehran...

As Australian ambassador, did you meet with leaders of Muslim Brotherhood? What do you think about the group and the leaders? Do you think the Muslim Brotherhood is an integrated or divided community?
In keeping with the obligation of ambassadors to be familiar with social and political currents in the country to which they are accredited I met and extended hospitality to senior figures within the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo from 2005 to 2008.
I was aware that a range of views existed within the Brotherhood in regard to the approach to be taken toward the Egyptian government. Those conflicting ideas, which were in some cases based on generational differences between the established leadership and its younger members, and in other cases on arguments about the extent to which the Brotherhood should accommodate itself to the restrictions and human rights abuses suffered by its members and supporters, probably limited the extent to which the Brotherhood was able to engage productively with other parts of Egyptian civil society and politics. It remained a somewhat secretive, tightly-controlled organization unlikely to win the trust of other parts of Egyptian politics or to come up with innovative approaches for the delivery of its programs in government.  

What are the wrong and right actions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian army in your opinion? Can we blame the Muslim Brotherhood for the current situation in Egypt?
The Muslim Brotherhood emerged from the overthrow of President Mubarak as the most cohesive and effective political force in Egypt, but for the reasons mentioned earlier it was not well-prepared for the responsibilities of government. Although it recognized the need to have a workable relationship with the Egyptian military, and offered the military some enhanced privileges under the new constitution, it failed to build an inclusive political approach that would sustain the support of other important parts of the Egyptian political system. Instead, the actions of the Brotherhood tended to add to divisions between those Egyptians who saw themselves as committed to an Islamic identity, and those who did not. Many Egyptians were disappointed with the economic performance of the new government, and some feared the intrusion of an Islamist government into issues of personal behaviour. Both the military and the Egyptian population at large had clearly lost confidence in the Muslim Brotherhood government under President Morsy by mid-2013.
Against that background, the deaths of large numbers of Egyptians demonstrating against the removal of President Morsy was an enormous tragedy for Egypt, and its full effects are likely to continue to be felt for many years. It would have been far more appropriate for Morsy to have accepted advice that fresh elections needed to be held, and for the Egyptian military to have refrained from the violent dispersal of the demonstrators, as external mediators proposed. The refusal on the part of the Brotherhood to accept that its popular support had collapsed, and the decision of the military to crush the demonstrations were political and moral failures on the part of both the Brotherhood and the Egyptian military leadership. 

What do you think about the western countries and Arab countries’ approaches to recent Egyptian developments?
There will continue to be a great deal at stake for both the Arab world and western countries where Egypt is concerned. One in every four Arabs is an Egyptian. It remains the most significant Arab country in terms of politics, culture and engagement with the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. It occupies a vital strategic location for the Arab world, no less than it does for Europe, North-East Asia and the United States.
It is natural for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to regard the stability of Egypt as essential to their own security, and to act accordingly. It is just as natural for Egypt to maintain the closest possible relations with those countries and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and to be attuned to their concerns on economic, political and financial issues.
For the western countries, the question of what approach should be taken to Egypt will be shaped by a wider range of considerations. Among such considerations strategic interests and security matters are important at a time of great uncertainty and risk in the region. So too, however, is the consistency with which those countries wish to apply normative values and global concerns to their bilateral dealings with Egypt and other regional countries.
The human rights record of Egypt is a matter of particular concern at present, not least because the repressive approach to dissenting political voices is likely to perpetuate the insecurity that followed the removal of the Morsy government. But there are many aspects to the relationship with Egypt, and an argument can be made that stronger efforts to promote trade and investment and the restoration of high rates of economic growth may be needed, along with ongoing efforts to discuss human rights concerns, to build a relationship through which both human rights and security concerns can eventually be addressed.
Ultimately the values of Egypt have to be rebooted by Egyptians themselves. For westerners to be seen as seeking to shape outcomes directly would be a recipe for damage to the standing of whichever group outsiders were perceived to support (including, somewhat paradoxically, the civil society forces most needed to help build a stable, progressive Egypt). The overall western focus has to be on strengthening institutional capability in ways which build positive and constructive relationships both at the state level and at levels beyond state to state relations.       

What is your prediction about the future of Egypt in the Sisi era?
Fifty years ago, when the Chinese statesman Chou En-Lai was asked for his opinion on the French Revolution, he replied that it remained too soon to tell. I think the same can be said about Egypt since 2011.
It remains tempting to believe that the turmoil in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq is transitory—that reaffirmation of those values and progress will be possible with the right balance between visionary political leadership, external assistance and recognition of the imperative of broadly-based political mobilization and sustainable economic growth.
Despite obvious difficulties, it could be hoped that among Arab countries that have not descended into civil war the capacity to harness the intellectual energy of a more empowered political audience, and thereby to make further progress in terms of human security and economic development is more likely to improve than to regress over the coming decade.

But the evidence, both historical and contemporary, points in a darker direction. The combination of political dysfunction, social change and economic and environmental stress suggests a likelihood that, for the rest of this decade, Egypt and a majority of countries of the Arab world will continue to experience economic and political malaise.

How many of Egypt’s population support the Muslim Brotherhood in your assessment?
It is impossible to estimate with confidence the actual extent of that support, both now and in the period of political crisis from 2011 to 2013. However the trends in support are pretty clear when talking with ordinary Egyptians.
The Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed support until the overthrow of the Morsy government in part because it was able to present itself as an alternative to the corruption and dynastic ambitions of the Mubarak regime; and in part because it had a grass-roots presence that was more active than the government or other opposition political parties.
However in many rural and impoverished areas with low levels of literacy the Brotherhood did not necessarily enjoy stronger support than salafist groups and traditional power brokers. Moreover, the support that it did enjoy clearly diminished as it failed to make a positive improvement to the economic situation of most Egyptians. Much of the earlier support for the Brotherhood shifted to President al-Sisi as a result of that disappointment and in the hope that his government could achieve a stronger performance.  

Do you think the Qatar and Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood is effective? Do you think they can improve their relation with Egypt?
There is unlikely to be any significant improvement in relations between Egypt and Turkey so long as the present approach of both sides to the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood continues. Under President Erdogan Turkey sees itself as a leading voice for Islamic modernity that is obliged to demand respect for the political rights of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters. Those views are completely unacceptable to Egypt. The situation in regard to Qatar is somewhat different because, as an Arab country, it enjoys closer relations with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is anxious to build a greater level of Arab cohesion in response to the uncertainty of the regional security situation. There have been several indications recently that so long as Qatar avoids provocative comments and actions in regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian side will probably agree to meet the Saudi desire to see a gradual easing of tensions between them.  

As an experienced diplomat, what is the main obstacle in the way of reach democracy in Middle East and particularly in Egypt in your opinion?
Like much of the Arab world, Egypt is stalled somewhere between the terminal decline of an authoritarian order and the emergence of an inclusive, empowered model of Arab modernity.
In the meantime, the cumulative and corrosive effects of violence inflicted upon Arab societies, the degeneration of the authority of key states within the Arab world, and the unstoppable drivers of change – demographic pressures, education, literacy and connectivity - are now key factors shaping the Egyptian outlook.

Repression under Mubarak not only stifled politics, but perpetuated a vacuum where civil society should or might have had a meaningful place. There is a significant risk that ongoing repression will both negate the possibility of Islamist opinion in Egypt, particularly, finding legitimate expression in political life; and will also reduce the likelihood —or the incentive—for other political forces to emerge that might be capable of reaffirming values of inclusiveness and constitutionalism, and capturing the imagination and energy of the millennial generation of the middle class.

These challenges can probably be met to a degree which keeps popular frustrations in check, especially if economic growth can be achieved at a rate which provides some relief from graduate unemployment and inflationary pressures. Over time, however, the result is more likely than not to be self-censorship or departure of reform-minded intellectuals and activists from the scene (often to western countries or less repressive places in the Arab world).

The full consequences of that loss of intellectual capital may not be felt for a generation; but a more immediate effect may well be the occupation of the space between state and society by those who are more disposed toward active confrontation with the state, rather than politics. 

The debate about what it means to be both modern and Arab is not a polite academic discussion. It is a politically-charged, sometimes physically violent, partly inter-generational encounter between opposing poles of identity. And amidst contending views on such fundamental issues as education reform and gender empowerment—and in the absence of programmatic approaches to delivering reforms required in those areas—Egypt and much of the Arab world is losing its capacity to compete on a global stage.

Do you think ISIS is a real threat for Egypt? Do you think terrorism is the main challenge facing Egypt, or is its government using the issue for oppression of the opposition?
IS and other jihadist groups are clearly a threat to Egyptian security and are limiting economic performance in key areas such as tourism. But looking ahead the greater risk is that as they fall ever further behind, the desire among Arab societies —and among alienated and marginalized Muslims within western societies—to be measured against the intellectual and other norms of so-called global modernity will also diminish. And to the extent that such determination to succeed in the global arena diminishes, those societies are more likely to fail to meet the demographic, environmental and other security challenges that are now being faced across the Arab world. 

Unless those challenges are surmounted, jihadism is here to stay, not only in the Egyptian and Arab context, but for the West as well.